ISSN: 1522-5658

An Anthropological View of the Modernist Crisis

David G. Schultenover, S.J.
Creighton University

[1] The "Modernist" crisis in the Roman Catholic Church is not well understood apart from the social-cultural backgrounds of the principal figures involved in it. This paper attempts to describe the context of the crisis from various anthropological perspectives - geographical, cultural, social - and so to illuminate its inner dynamics.

[2] The "minds" or ideologies that squared off in this crisis are, for the most part, located in western Europe. The first and most general distinction regarding these "minds" is one that dominated the new field of cultural anthropology in the late nineteenth century and was made from the not unbiased perspective of the northern European cultures that founded the study. Thus, they distinguished between the "particularist" mind - associated with northern European cultures that favor non-tribal, solitary habitation, prize egality and individual identity and dignity, and cultivate energetic, industrious, direct, honest, and peace-loving people - and the "collectivist" mind - associated with southern European cultures that favor tribal habitation, prize group identity and loyalty, and cultivate idle, suspicious, dishonest, and bellicose people (Tourville: 83-91). The reader will note the pejorative characterization of the latter cultures!

[3] Applied to the Modernist crisis, the particularist mind would characterize the Modernists and their sympathizers, while the collectivist mind would characterize the anti-Modernists or the Vatican and its supporters. While one could mount an argument to support this assignment, anthropological and cultural studies even in their infancy recognized more subtle differences than just these two. Since the nineteenth century, the field has progressed dramatically, to show a very complex development of cultural layers that have combined to produce modern societies.

[4] To sort through the complexities, two broad approaches are possible - the macro and micro, or social and psychological. The macro (social) approach looks at cultural backdrops to identify the social factors that help explain events. The micro (psychological) approach looks at the individual personalities involved to discover what factors unique to those personalities contributed to events. These two approaches are, of course, interconnected, as each personality, for all its uniqueness, is embedded in a culture and so is at least predisposed to behave in certain culturally qualified ways.

[5] The macro approach is of primary interest for this paper. Using it, one can specify three salient "minds" or ideologies most pertinent to the Modernist crisis: the Mediterranean, the French, and the Anglo-Saxon. However, these three are not undifferentiated and straightforward, as if there were only one Mediterranean, one French, and one Anglo-Saxon mind. The first task will be to distinguish within each of these cultural designations which Mediterranean, which French, and which Anglo-Saxon mind or minds we are talking about. Admittedly we are dealing here with extremely complex phenomena. Yet, at least on one level, generalizations, such as "that is so typically English/French/Italian," make sense to people. As much as the notion of national characteristics is fraught with difficulties and contra-indications, they do arise from experience, and there does seem to be something to them. In other words, discernibly different cultures do give rise to discernibly different behaviors.

[6] Denomination of cultural characteristics probably goes back to prehistory. In Europe some of the earliest descriptions on record are from Tacitus' Germania. Some of his observations are particularly striking, in that 1600 years later Montesquieu made very similar observations,<1> and today certain anthropological studies suggest that these long-lived differences are not accidental, but have deep socio-cultural roots.<2>

[7] Using the findings of geographical anthropologists Emmanuel Todd and Hervé Le Bras, combined with the grid/group theories of Mary Douglas and Bruce Malina, this paper will proceed in three parts: Part one will sketch Todd's four main family systems, locate them geographically in relation to the dynamics of the Modernist crisis, and finally describe how the family systems function around certain, key values. Part two will apply the descriptions of part one to specific social-cultural groups and individuals pertinent to the Modernist crisis. Finally, part three will examine how Todd's family systems, qualified by Malina's family "scripts," apply to Modernists Alfred Loisy and George Tyrrell vis-à-vis the anti-Modernist Pope Pius X.

[8] The underlying thesis is that the Modernist crisis was not simply about doctrinal or methodological differences between Vaticanists and so-called "Modernists," but that much of the energy that drove the crisis stemmed from ideological differences, which in turn result at least partially from socio-cultural differences. Todd contends, as we shall see, that one's family of origin, especially when socially grouped with structurally similar families, plays a critical role in how one looks at reality and makes value judgments - for example, what "freedom" and "equality" mean and how they might be legitimately exercised by individuals over against social groups. This paper will argue that to understand the Modernist crisis one must take into account underlying social-cultural factors that gave rise to differing views and judgments about how the Catholic Church ought to relate to the emerging patterns of the modern world as they affect religious belief and practice.

[9] As a long-time student of the Modernist crisis, I have found the approach explored in this study more illuminative of the underlying motivations of the principal figures and dynamics of the crisis than any other. Were I a trained cultural anthropologist and sociologist, I would probably be bold enough to claim that the family systems model developed here goes beyond description to causes and explanations. However, as one who merely borrows from experts, my claim is more modest. What I develop here is but one model for the inner dynamics of the Modernist crisis. As such it is merely descriptive. However, the reader will observe that I occasionally stray toward the bolder claims of experts. When I do, I wish to confess that such strayings are driven rather by intuition than brute science.

Part One: Four Family Systems

An Exploration into Their Structures and Ideologies

[10] At the heart of the Modernist crisis was a sharp difference in ideology between the Modernists and the anti-Modernists. The former were open to historical development and adventurous in investigating how the church changed over time and needed to continue to change to be faithful to its mission of both preserving and handing on the ancient faith. The latter were cautious, if not closed, to historical development, seeing the church in its pristine form and doctrine as a timeless reality needing to be preserved without change.

[11] Todd, in the tradition of Frédéric Le Play (1806-82), attempts to get to the root of ideological difference. He ventures the "universal hypothesis" that "the ideological system is everywhere the intellectual embodiment of family structure, a transposition into social relations of the fundamental values which govern elementary human relations" such as "liberty or equality, and their opposites" (1985: 17).

[12] He goes on to define seven family types worldwide, but just four in western Europe. All four types show up in France - not surprisingly, given France's medial position between northern and southern Europe. These four come to circulate around the two cardinal ideas of the French Revolution, liberty and equality - according to Le Play's contention that the father-son relationship regarding inheritance determines one's concept of liberty or its opposite (authority), while the bond between brothers, also influenced by inheritance patterns, determines one's concept of equality or inequality. First, regarding liberty/authority: the practice of offspring continuing to live with their parents after marriage sets up a "vertical relationship" within an extended family group to yield the authoritarian or stem family model; whereas offspring leaving the parental household upon marriage to form independent households conforms to the liberal model and fosters individualism and independent thinking. Second, regarding equality/inequality: dividing inheritance among the heirs fosters equality, while handing down the patrimony whole and entire to a single heir fosters inequality.

[13] These two sets of variables - liberty and equality - should logically yield four possible types of family systems (Todd's term for each is given in parentheses):

1. liberal and inegalitarian (absolute nuclear family)
2. liberal and egalitarian (egalitarian nuclear family)
3. authoritarian and inegalitarian (authoritarian or stem family)
4. authoritarian and egalitarian (community or patriarchal family)

The first two types have affinities around the value of liberty, the third and fourth around the value of authority. These two groupings, therefore, correspond to the gross distinction between "particularist" and "collectivist."

[14] Before delving into the dynamics of these family types, it might help from the outset to think about this fourfold division in terms of the figures involved in the Modernist crisis. I would suggest the following scheme (significantly qualified in later sections of this chapter):

English Modernists: absolute nuclear family.
French Modernists: egalitarian nuclear family.
Italian Modernists: egalitarian nuclear (and patriarchal community family?).
Vatican anti-Modernists: authoritarian or stem family.

"Family" here applies to the Vatican only analogously, since "the Vatican" is not a biological but a fictive kinship. I would argue (a) that all clergy join the Vatican "family" and thus receive a secondary socialization from their seminary training that either reinforces or is in tension with the primary socialization of their biological families<3> and (b) that higher clergy - I refer to them as "Vaticanists" - are bonded more tightly to the Vatican "family" than are lower clergy and therefore generally cede behaviors of their primary socialization to those of their secondary socialization in the authoritarian or stem family.<4> The closer to the center of power, the more encompassing the socialization, and thus the tighter the bond and the more controlled the behavior. I see these family types, which I have associated with the various "players" in the Modernist crisis, functioning at least as illuminative typologies, but I believe there is also a conditional/causal mechanism at work: socialization conditions/causes one to see the world and behave in typical ways. Vatican influence extends throughout the church via such institutional structures as seminaries and schools. Contact with the "outside world" diminishes its influence, however, so it is in the Vatican's interest to cut the competition by promoting a closed culture - which it had done with great success until faced with the irresistable globalization created by modern economies and technologies (see Goffman).<5> The comprehensive sociological data required to establish my hunch regarding the causal mechanism of these family types in the Modernist crisis are currently beyond my reach. The correlations I will make are anecdotal and could reflect my prejudices. The reader will have to judge.

[15] Preliminary synopsis of how the family systems work:

Type 1 (absolute nuclear): Property is owned by a single owner, usually the head of a household. Lacking precise inheritance rules, arbitrary wills are common practice. Adult offspring are not encouraged to live with parents but are expected to found their own households; there is no interest in household continuity. Uncertainty about inheritance and other practices, such as boarding children at school and/or sending them away to work, encourages individualism. One finds in Type 1 strong ideas of liberty and inequality. Principal regions of interest for modernist studies: regions dominated by Anglo-Saxons (England, North America).

Type 2 (egalitarian nuclear): Inheritance is generally passed on by dividing it equally among the male offspring, who are expected not to live with their parents but to found their own households, thus fostering strong ideas of individuality, liberty, and equality. Principal regions of interest: the Paris basin and Italy, excluding the central section (Umbria, Tuscany, Marche, Liguria, and Emilia-Romagna).

Type 3 (authoritarian/stem): Patrimony is passed unbroken to one of the sons, who cohabits with his parents, thus promoting inequality among brothers and strong ideas of authority and dependence. Principal regions of interest: France's peripheral regions, Germany, and the Vatican.

Type 4 (patriarchal community): Property is held in common by all members of the extended family but is managed by one authority figure. Married sons and their parents cohabit, fostering strong ideas of authority and equality. Primary region of interest: central Italy.

[16] Todd offers the following schematic of these four types of European families and identifies a nation with each (1985: 16); I have identified the Vatican with Type 3.

[17] France, particularly the region around Paris, embraced the ideas of liberty and equality; England the idea of liberty but not equality; Germany the idea of inequality and authority expressed by submission to the state; and Russia the idea of authoritarian, egalitarian communism which proclaims itself universal. Based on Malina's argument, I would conclude that the Vatican exemplifies primarily Type 3 with some characteristics of Type 4 (Malina 1986: 29, 33, 111, 145, 181). Thus the Vatican replicates the family with a strong father-son relationship and patrimony bequeathed unbroken to a single descendent. The Vatican proclaims universalism but is conflicted over the issue of grace and revelation being unequally received, if not unequally given - as Reformed Protestantism frankly asserts. The Catholic Church wants to affirm both God's absolute sovereignty and freedom in grace-giving and at the same time the equality of God's grace-giving, and so it feels ambivalent and teaches ambiguously on equality.

How the Family Systems Function

The Families and Liberty

[18] All four family systems considered here are almost entirely exogamous (marriage partners are found outside one's own extended family). In both nuclear systems (Types 1 and 2), the choice of marriage partner is up to the offspring. This custom, Todd suggests, "expresses an idea about authority and a conception of justice just as much as rules on inheritance and cohabitation" (1985: 26). It encourages independence of thought and freedom of choice. In Types 3 and 4, however, marriages tend to be "arranged." Parental management of marriage, combined with the cohabitation of two or more generations of adults, ensures an unbroken patrimony and tradition. This pattern prevails especially in community families in the Mediterranean basin in which the prescription of exogamy is relaxed toward endogamy (marriage partners found within one's extended family) and the individual submits the choice of marriage partner to impersonal custom rather than to a father. Because the power is impersonal (custom) and not exercised by a fallible individual, it may not be challenged. (Clearly the Vatican slips over into this type of system as well as into the Russian type.)

The Families and Equality/Inequality

[19] The English family's type of inequality is different from that of the German (and Vatican) inequality. The general principle in England is that the offspring are all equally "on their own." Thus English equality is characterized by much homogeneity, but the latter is self-imposed (see cartoon).

[20] Inheritance, bequeathed according to no fixed norms, may or may not be forthcoming, so that offspring cannot count on it, whereas in the German (and Vatican) family, inheritance is passed on generally to the firstborn son, thus excluding the younger sons. (The Vatican analogue would be apostolic succession.) This system therefore promotes a heterogeneous view of human relations and so too of social and ideological life. Thus it becomes difficult for the English and nearly impossible for Germans to form and accept the idea of "universal man," à la the French Revolution. The Vatican "family," as already indicated, is ambiguous on the matter. It proclaims "universal man" in theory while discounting it in practice. It likes the notion of being "chosen," "set apart," "predestined" to a patrimony, for early in its development, during the Constantinian era to be exact, its upper echelon joined the authoritarian Roman elite - which is why I locate the Vatican primarily in the authoritarian/stem family. On the theoretical plane, the Vatican feels justified in imposing universal rule, replicating God's sovereignty and equal love for all, but on the practical level, the Vatican cannot treat each person or culture equally, because cultures are not homogeneous. Some will acquiesce and even rejoice in imperial rule, others will bristle and reject it, depending - to Todd's mind - on one's root family system.

The Exogamous Community Family (Type 4)

[21] Patriarchal authority in this system is both strong and intolerant but at the same time fragile and vulnerable to revolution, because authority weighs heavily on brothers who, because they are equal, can readily join forces against the authoritarian oppressor. The Vatican "family," to the degree that it slips from Type 3 into Type 4, also becomes susceptible to revolt. It was perhaps this dynamic that played itself out in the Protestant Revolt/Reformation; it was at work, to a lesser degree, also in the defiance of certain Modernists and, to a greater degree, in the contemporary progressive dechristianization of formerly Catholic territories (much of France, central Italy, and Communist bloc countries).

The Authoritarian (Stem) Family (Type 3)

[22] In fact, it might not be the case that the Vatican "slips into" Type 4. It might actually begin in Type 4 and struggle to climb into Type 3, for the Roman family itself fits into Type 4: strong but fragile patriarchal authority and strong solidarity among egalitarian brothers. The egalitarian aspect of Type 4 made it easy for Rome to extend citizenship to all its conquered foreigners, to disregard - at its peril - significant differences in cultures and races, and, in a word, to create an empire of Roman citizens. The Catholic Church followed the same script, except that it also had within it a Jewish foundation in Type 3 that rests on primogeniture and inequality - thus the ambiguity of the Vatican "family" toward the notion of universal man. To the extent that the Vatican takes Gal. 3:28 seriously ("There is neither Jew nor Greek . . . for you are all one in Christ Jesus"), it espouses universalism. To the extent that this ideal remains existentially unrealized, in practice it espouses inequality. Thus, Vatican authority is also fragile and open to revolution. Conceivably, all the reversals suffered by Vatican policies over the centuries - the schisms, the dechristianization of so many formerly Catholic lands, the dead-ending of much of Catholicism's missionary effort (see Donovan) - are tied in with the Vatican's practical inegalitarianism and inability wholeheartedly to embrace a tolerant universalism.<7>

[23] Another salient quality of the stem family model is revealed in its relationship to time. As it focuses on preserving an unbroken patrimony, this family is keenly aware of the past and sensitive to temporal linearity. For the Vatican this focus translates into apostolic succession and traditionalism. The latter has its strengths in terms of purity of doctrine, but it can also lead to doctrinal sclerosis on the one hand and teratism on the other. Just as this quality can lead authoritarian nations into crass ethnocentrism, so it can lead - and has led - the Vatican "family" into such doctrines as "no salvation outside the church" and doubting that anyone outside the "family" (e.g. women, blacks) has a soul. Traditionalism also makes it difficult for the Vatican authentically to dialogue with dissenters within and with other religions without; after all, the blue blood of patrimony does not run true in their veins. As Todd observes, "the authoritarian family is based on an aristocratic exclusion from inheritance of all but one of the brothers. Accepting the principle of inequality in interpersonal relations, it transposes this ideal onto the ideological plane, creating the inequality of men, of peoples and of races." Ironically, however, "economic logic undermines this ideological dream," for "the economic structure of countries with an authoritarian family system is almost always relatively egalitarian" (1985: 61).

[24] The logic is this: every authoritarian household must have a strong head, but each household is in competition with every other household to maintain its respective property rights before each other and the body politic. Thus a kind of middling peasantry is born that carries the country along in a relatively stable homeostasis. For the Vatican, this means that the rank and file save the hierarchical command from itself. Or, put more gracefully in Augustine's words much cited by Newman, "securus judicat orbis terrarum" (Contra epistolam Parmeniani, iii. 24: "the whole world judges with assuredness"; cf. Newman 1864: 116-17; 1890: 2:35, 40-43, notes; 1892-94: 2:303, 372). Or in terms of Vatican I, infallibility is a quality inherent in the church, not in any given member of the church, however lofty. The saving grace rests in the whole, not in the parts, except to the extent that they participate in the whole.

[25] Put differently, the authoritarian family transmits inegalitarian values through primogeniture while encouraging egalitarian social practice at the broad base of population. Contrariwise, nuclear and community families transmit egalitarian values but encourage inegalitarian social practice. Ideologically, therefore, the authoritarian and the other systems can either be at loggerheads or complement each other. In the Modernist crisis they were at loggerheads. The "Modernists," influenced in their primary socialization by the values of nuclear, egalitarian, and community family systems which were not overridden by their secondary socialization in the seminary, loomed before the Vatican as challenges to its authority and to its indivisible patrimony. This was true whether the challenge came from England and Tyrrell (absolute nuclear), from the Paris basin and Loisy (egalitarian nuclear), or from Italy and Buonaiuti (egalitarian nuclear and patriarchal community).

[26] An apparent anomaly in the authoritarian family is indicated by the important role assigned to women. Transmitting strong behavioral norms through its absolutely vertical structure distinguishes this family system; but individuals are molded primarily through education, where women, particularly as primary care givers, play a key role. Also, the overriding value of the authoritarian family is the permanence not of the male line but of the household, so that in some cultures, should there be either no son or no son as eldest in the family, primogeniture may fall to the eldest female child.

[27] A corollary is that the "male" as such does not exist in the authoritarian primogeniture system, so that "maleness" cannot be sacralized, as in patriarchal community families. Rather, there are heirs and non-heirs. The disinherited are usually the younger sons, whose only hope becomes either to marry an heiress or to become a soldier, monk, priest, or landless laborer. In periods of demographic growth and industrialization, as in nineteenth-century Europe, many disinherited sons were available for such positions. For the Vatican, however, with its hierarchical system inherited both from imperial Rome and the Jewish temple system, elite males occupied a quasi-sacred position that was at the same time fragile, as we saw above (Malina 1986: 29, 110-11). More on this point below.

[28] The upshot is that, as Todd notes,

the authoritarian family structure is a mass of contradictions. It seeks to apply the principle of authority and produces anarchy as much as discipline. It simultaneously creates a rigid family core, shaping and stifling the individual in its vertical structure, and free men who are rejected by the domestic group and have no previously defined place in society.

These "free men" would be the rejected sons who are "free" to find their own way in society. The authoritarian system, Todd continues, "preaches inequality but favors the development of rural societies which are in practice egalitarian. Finally, it emphasizes continuity in the male line yet gives women a major role." All these inherent contradictions result in a psychologically pathogenic society.

Consciously exalting the power of the father and unconsciously elevating respect for the mother, combining discipline and individualism, rejecting all but one of the children, incapable of defining clearly the status of women, the authoritarian family is a neurotic machine.

At this point Todd ascribes more analytical power to his model than I am prepared to grant. However, his inference is striking and logic somewhat plausible (which does not make it true). I include his inference only because it suggests the direction a dysfunctioning authoritarian system can take:

Its activity lies at the root of the Nazi phenomenon, of Basque and Irish terrorism, of the suicidal xenophobia of the Japanese during the Second World War. It equally underlies many of the severe religious creeds which combine discipline and intolerance, respect for the father and rejection of the brother: Lutheran and Presbyterian Protestantism, Judaism and Counter-Reformation Catholicism (1985: 65-66).

Certainly included in "Counter-Reformation Catholicism" would be integralist Catholicism.

[29] Such cultures function well enough in tranquil times, when love for family and country governs relationships, but ideological violence always lurks just below the surface, ready to flare up at the slightest provocation. Certainly Vatican history is spotted with such moments, not the least of which was the integralist anti-Modernist campaign. Flare-ups generally occur during phases of cultural pressure or transition - e.g. the medieval witch-hunts, the Vatican's anti-liberal centralization of the nineteenth century, and Nazism. Otherwise, in periods of cultural stability, the authoritarian family produces a political system that is at once bureaucratic and parliamentary, authoritarian and pluralist - as in Sweden, Germany, Norway, Austria, and Ireland, with variants in Japan and Israel (Todd 1985: 67-68, 81).

[30] Todd makes several other apposite observations about political ideologies that develop in authoritarian countries. Without exception, although the political ideology in each country has its peculiarities, the ideologies are all bureaucratic, pluralistic, and asymmetrical - meaning that political asymmetry replicates the asymmetrical family system, in which a strong central line of succession falls to the oldest brother, while the younger brothers are cast out to find their own way (1985: 75). Politically, this disparity expresses itself in a pattern of one dominant political party playing the role of the oldest brother and several smaller parties playing the role of the excluded younger brothers, as is found in all the countries of central Europe dominated by stem families. Surely it is found as well in the Catholic Church in the relationship between the bishop of Rome-cum-curia and the other bishops, and, on the diocesan level, between the bishop and "his" priests.<8>

[31] One of the major causes of tension in the Vatican during the time of the Modernist crisis was the church/state relationship in France. The progressive laws of secularization following the Revolution, state control of education, especially primary education, and the final law of separation in 1905 were all shattering blows to the Catholic Church's effort to maintain itself and stave off dechristianization. Anthropologically, behind the Vatican's trauma could well be Todd's suggestion that the authoritarian family's tap root is tied not to money but to property: recall that the property passed to the eldest son ensures the unbroken patrimony. However, with the nationalization of church property, particularly the schools, went both the patrimony and what that patrimony secured, namely, the vertical submission of "sons" to the "father" through education/formation in the Catholic schools. So long as the church was able to maintain its schools, it could prosper. Once the schools were nationalized, Catholicism was able to sustain its monopolistic hold and stave off the effects of socio-religious pluralization and secularization only in those areas where authoritarian family systems were favorable to the church - primarily beyond the ring of the Paris basin (Todd 1991: 74, 174-77; 1985: 78).

[32] While it is easy to delineate the fault-lines of the authoritarian family system, particularly as it expresses itself in ideological political systems, one must also note its strengths. It is remarkable in its ability to form stable, pluralist political systems. The strong vertical organization of society accounts for its stability, as well as its ability generally to tolerate individual differences - unlike its "heterophobic" patriarchal community counterpart. However, Todd notes that it does have "an unfortunate tendency to perceive differences which do not exist and to combat ideological phantoms of its own creation," which it defines "not as social heterogeneity, but as aggressive external forces." Germany's ideological creation of anti-Semitism during the Great Depression comes to mind. One might legitimately conclude that the "unfortunate tendency" to perceive and combat ideological phantoms becomes more pronounced in times of social stress than in times of social stability (Todd 1985: 89).<9>

[33] This observation translates readily to the Vatican. It is undeniably remarkable for its ability to produce a stable organization and, at least in principle, to tolerate individual differences - as exemplified in its long history of negotiating differences of liturgical and creedal expression. However, it has also in times of stress created phantoms of difference and then aggressively rooted them out, a tendency aggravated by a "heterophobia" accruing to it by reason of its immersion in the underlying community family system of central Italy. Observe that the Vatican geographically lies on the margin between the egalitarian nuclear family of southern Italy and the community family of central Italy, so that it bears characteristics of these two systems as well as of its own authoritarian type. Thus, particularly in times of stress, underlying characteristics of the broader culture can emerge to reinforce the authoritarian proclivity to conjure up phantoms of difference and then exorcise them.<10>

Two Forms of Individualism: Egalitarian Nuclear and Absolute Nuclear (Types 1 & 2)

[34] Both nuclear family models are individualistic. In the 1960s Alan Macfarlane and Peter Laslett with the SSRC Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure established that, at least since the early Middle Ages, the nuclear model has been the dominant family form in England. And from Le Play's descriptions in the nineteenth century one must suppose that it was also the dominant form in the Paris basin. Precisely how far back it goes is as yet undetermined, but Tourville found in Tacitus striking descriptions to suggest that this family form was in place by the first century C.E. (see especially, 78-164).

[35] The Enlightenment, coming out of France and England, apotheosized the individualist. Todd observes that "underlying the attachment of English and French thinkers to individualism is a shared anthropological determinism: the nuclear family, which emphasizes the mutual independence of children and parents and tries to make both into individuals, in city and country alike, in 1450 just as much as in 1900" (1985: 101). The qualities of the nuclear family, whether egalitarian (Paris basin) or absolute (England), made cultural transitions such as urbanization, industrialization, and the spread of literacy less stressful than in authoritarian cultures where strong authority exercised in the parent-child relationship made for a chronically uncertain equilibrium. Thus in the Industrial Age, England, followed by the Paris basin, developed quite rapidly, embracing a liberal political ideology. Simultaneously, the Vatican was experiencing great distress over the Roman Question and church-state issues with most Western countries, while Germany dealt with social stress by going to war (Franco-Prussian) and by preparing for war (World War I). The problem for community and authoritarian families is that industrialization leads to urbanization, which tends to sever generational ties, thereby eroding core family values.

[36] The adroitness with which England responded to industrialization was the theme of Edmond Demolins' enormously popular, A quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons? (1897). This book provoked a flood of commentary primarily in the French press, most of it supporting Demolins' thesis that English individualism, fostered both at home and in school, was the basis for England's global superiority. The destabilization following the Revolution certainly contributed to France's lag time, but after the convulsions of the Commune (spring 1871), she set about forging a parliamentary republic that aggressively embraced liberty, equality, and the individualistic temper. Unlike Germany whose authoritarian family system kept her mired in traditionalism, the nuclear family structure of the Paris basin enabled France to resist the pressure for totalitarianism that seems to accompany revolution (Todd 1985: 103).

[37] Another behavioral quality shared by the two types of nuclear family populations is indicated by the history of trade unionism: their rank and file are less easily controlled than in authoritarian and community populations. In Germany, the social democrats embraced socialist ideology and discipline without resistance; but in England, France, Spain, Portugal, and southern and northern Italy, although unions formed, workers rejected collectivist ideology and remained fractious, undisciplined, and anarchical. They resisted control by external authority and found it difficult to unite behind any one controlling internal voice. Their weapon of choice, therefore, became the "wildcat strike." A similar pattern emerges in economics: authoritarian societies readily bow to state-imposed economic discipline, whereas nuclear societies resist.

[38] Transfer these behavioral patterns to the Vatican's situation of an authoritarian ideology attempting to operate within societies that, on the basis of social structures, resist controlling, external authority, and one ends up with crises, at least in those historical moments of social stress when authoritarian families tend to dysfunction more than other types.

Equality versus Liberty

[39] The two nuclear family types both embrace liberty but part company on equality. England with its arbitrary inheritance system devalues equality, whereas the Paris basin with its pattern of equal division of property among sons esteems equality. However, living within the liberty-with-equality social pattern tends to be problematic, because, as Todd points out, the two values are, at least in practice, contradictory and lead to unstable social structures. The logic is this: free individual development (liberty) presupposes the emergence of individual differences (inequality), which on the family level tend to provoke quarrels. Translate this scenario to the political level, and one finds in France, for example, the spectacle of a country that suffered more than one hundred changes of government between 1814 and 1905 - a wonderment that Richard Bernstein refers to as "a country cut in one" (233-46). Egalitarianism in France means that every individual gets an equal opportunity, perhaps until adolescence. After that, vive la differance! Indeed, what generally pertains in northern France is that incongruity between freedom and equality leads to family quarrels which come to a head with the division of the paternal inheritance; after that, every son is on his own.

[40] In the history of the Catholic Church in France, one can perhaps see this complex of social relations reflected in the fact that the clergy in 1791 split down the middle on the issue of swearing loyalty to the revolutionary constitution. It also appears in the relative positions adopted over many years on such issues as Gallicanism, the Dreyfus Affair, and controversial figures like Loisy (Todd 1991: 43, 95). Fraternal solidarity goes only so far.

[41] Threatening the equipoise of liberty/equality in France during the nineteenth century was the achievement of widespread literacy, which tended to overbalance the scale on the side of liberty or independence of thought. Not until the Third Republic did France succeed in achieving anything like a stable synthesis between those two values. The same pattern pertains in other countries possessing a preponderance of egalitarian nuclear families: Greece, Latin America, Spain, and Italy. Here the clash between individualism and egalitarianism produces periodic oscillation between two political poles, one liberal, the other militaristic (Todd 1985: 110-11).

[42] The two forms of individualism also diverge over the male-female relationship. The egalitarian nuclear family with its principle of equality between brothers implies at once both masculine solidarity and male-female inequality, a situation regarded as natural and even divinely ordained (Gilmore; Gilmore and Gilmore; Saunders; Schultenover 1993: 17 n. 21, 161-228). The male-female polarization is more pronounced in Latin countries than in northern France, and the tension engendered leads to the violence characteristic of these countries (Schultenover 1993: 117ff.). Todd points out that this violence can be directed either at individuals through personal injury or murder or at societies through liberal revolutions or coups. Both the authoritarian and the absolute nuclear families accept strong feminine authority, but in the authoritarian family tension arises between the male offspring and his mother, whereas in the egalitarian nuclear family it arises between a man and his wife. Excessive son-mother tensions also occur in Mediterranean families (egalitarian nuclear and exogamous community) due to mothering patterns peculiar to those social complexes (Gilmore). The absolute nuclear family produces less tension and so less violence than the other family types, encourages more cooperation within society, is culturally more dynamic than its egalitarian counterpart, and is educationally more progressive (Todd 1985: 112-14)<11> - thus the British economic dominance in the nineteenth century. The male-female polarity here described bears directly on the Modernist crisis and the violence displayed by anti-Modernists, but, as I have treated this matter at length elsewhere (Schultenover 1993: 117 n. 21, 161-228), I need not go into it here.

[43] As Roman Catholicism in its later European form is vertically structured and authoritarian, it makes sense that this form of religious institution should take root most strongly in countries dominated by authoritarian family systems. Such countries as Bavaria and Ireland, for example, tend to be devout, whereas nuclear family countries tend to be religiously indifferent. The latter are wont to show little predilection for the father image that is so prominent in Catholicism, nor do they forthrightly reject it as do community family regions (much of the former Soviet bloc). Nuclear family regions, however, react negatively to authoritarian religions that incorporate creeds of submission and demonstrate top-down control, as Roman Catholicism and European Lutheranism do, particularly since the Wars of Religion.<12> Following that debacle, many people, especially of nuclear family extraction, spurned superior religious authority as bankrupt and drifted off into individualist and sectarian beliefs.

[44] In addition, people in egalitarian nuclear family regions tended to react more vigorously against paternal authoritarianism of the Counter-Reformation variety than did people in absolute nuclear family regions, because the former tended much more toward machismo. In other words, they felt their masculinity threatened by the heavy hand of paternal authority and reacted accordingly. Husbands tended to see the church, whether symbolically or at times even physically (as in the practice of auricular confession), as a rival for their wives' attention. Hence dechristianization in France during the nineteenth century was anticlerical, not anti-religious. Born of individualism, it rejected the authority of the priest, not the authority of religion; and, while it emphasized individualistic values, it did not reject communitarian aspects of religion.

[45] Dechristianization moved forward vigorously in the Paris basin and met significant resistance only in the fringe areas dominated by an authoritarian and matriarchal bias. And politically, as Todd observes, it expressed itself "not in Soviet-style anti-religious propaganda but in a desire to separate church and state," which France achieved finally in 1905 (1985: 119).

[46] Thus the Vatican anti-Modernist reaction, when it pointed to individualism as tied to the root cause of Modernism, accords well with this social contruct (Schultenover 1993: 17-38, 161-228). Whether the Vatican was decrying liberalism, Protestantism, or Kantianism, all these "isms" revolved around individualism as defiance of that strong vertical patriarchalism so readily embraced by authoritarian cultures but resisted by individualist cultures.

Part Two: Family Scripts

Applying Family Types to Specific Nations and Individuals

[47] The principal Modernists came mainly out of the individualist cultures of the Paris basin, England, and Italy. Egalitarian nuclear cultures, characterized by the expectation that offspring are to found their own households, encourage independence and liberality of thought. Absolute nuclear cultures encourage adventurousness and individualism but not equality. These cultures would be most tolerant of differences and new ideas.

[48] The primary socialization of the "Modernists," therefore, would have led them, on the one hand, to exhibit the behavior and espouse the values of the absolute nuclear (e.g. Tyrrell) and egalitarian nuclear (e.g. Loisy, Buonaiuti) families. On the other hand, it would have set them in tension with their secondary socialization received through the church. Obviously, not every inhabitant of these regions became a "Modernist," but the cultures surely prepared and supported certain individuals, for whatever contingently personal reasons, to raise their voices in protest against Vatican authoritarianism.

[49] Anti-Modernists might have had roots in various family types, but once they - especially those in higher office - committed themselves to the Vatican culture, their primary socialization ceded to their secondary socialization, and they exhibited the values and behaviors of the authoritarian/stem family.

Authoritarian/Stem Family (Vatican) Script

[50] The Roman Catholic Church, particularly in its robustly anti-Reformation/anti-Enlightenment/anti-Revolution, centralized form, replicates characteristics of the stem family with its vertically structured authority and zeal for the undivided patrimony. To protect and pass on the patrimony intact, this system relies on strong group identity along with doctrinal and liturgical purity, resolutely guarded and maintained by stringent rules and boundaries.<13>

[51] As in the authoritarian family, so in the modern Roman Church, the line of authority is vertical. As in the family, where members fall by birth into a pecking order, so in the church, members fall by fictive birth (baptism, ordination, inauguration, or other ritual swearings in) into hierarchically arranged layers. Occasionally someone of higher rank might ordain a lower member to a higher status according to a fixed ritual for such transitions, but should anyone attempt on her own to presume an authority not accruing to her status, right order is breached and stern counter-measures follow.

[52] Expressions of individualism are not entirely lacking in this family system, but they are strictly subordinated to roles assigned according to one's location in the family order. Only those at the pinnacle of power may act individualistically. Even here, however, such behavior would invite wonder and suspicion and put at risk the loyalty of lower members. A preordained order is expected for everyone, and everyone is expected to act accordingly. Thus, this family system tends to be formal and to insist on the use of titles and labels at all times.

[53] Causality in the authoritarian family is perceived as personal: someone, not something, is always responsible for good or ill and is to be praised or blamed. Given the hierarchical ordering of this family, one naturally looks outside one's self for the cause of benefits and troubles. That is, one may be acting on one's own authority, but one is always aware that this authority is exercised only in the context of delegation from a higher power. If no human cause is readily apparent, praise or blame will fall to a non-visible cause, whether human or super-human - for example, a group of conspirators, spirits, or demons. This family system provides rich soil for conspiracy theories. (Thus conspiracy theories were a staple of anti-Modernist polemics among Vaticanists such as Delassus and Barbier in France and some of the writers for La Civiltà Cattolica in Italy [see Misner: 290, 305, 308-17].)

[54] Generally, in authoritarian systems, given the emphasis on right order and control, there is at least a seeming overplus of trouble and misfortune; so too there is an overplus of negative finger-pointing and blaming. After all, every person in authority is charged with guarding the patrimony. So there is a built-in negative cast of mind: one is always guarding against defection. When something goes wrong, higher-ups and lower-downs tend to blame each other. Someone has to be at fault, and the accused is guilty until proven innocent, resulting in a notable lack of trust.

[55] One can therefore expect in this society a sharp division between the bearers and the non-bearers of authority, between superiors and subjects. Likewise one can expect stiff resistance to change, since change often translates as a threat to patrimony. This society will therefore tend to be formal and traditionalist, given to stringent methods of control. When change does occur - usually perforce, as when calamity strikes - it is directed by authority from the top down and is accepted with minimal distress. For example, compared to Italy, Germany was easy to mobilize for war. However, when threats come, bearers of authority feel put upon more than do underlings. They, after all, bear primary responsibility for the patrimony; also, they have the most to lose. Subordinates can easily forego responsibility and even deny they bear any, as in the Nuremberg trials. The danger, of course, is that dysfunction at the top leads to dysfunction throughout. Particularly at times of social stress scapegoating becomes the palliative of beleaguered authorities.

[56] The script so far discussed pertains primarily to minority elites of authoritarian societies, whose experience largely matches expectations and who thus live in the myth of "the best of all possible worlds." The majority non-elites, whose experience often fails to match expectations, know that their world is not the best, so they follow a coordinate but often contrasting script. Where elites generally feel burdened by authority and responsibility, non-elites feel burdened by pressures toward marginal existence with attendant personal and social failures. Thus non-elites live with greater fears and tend to be more defensive and distrustful, especially toward anyone or anything perceived as able to widen the gap between expectation and experience. If elites bear the burden of leadership and decision-making, non-elites bear more immediately and directly the burden of those decisions - rather like commanders vis-à-vis soldiers. If elites assume prescriptive responsibility for the patrimony, devising protective measures against deceitful threats, non-elites in the trenches know and practice deceit as a way of life. If elites tend to oppose change, non-elites, having less to lose and more to gain, embrace it more readily, indeed sometimes even mounting revolutions. Similarly with time. Elites, denying change, take a long view in both directions - memorializing the foundational past and looking optimistically toward an enduring future. Non-elites take a foreshortened view, as present vulnerability focuses attention on immediate survival. Because they are more anxious about life, non-elites tend to even more finger-pointing, more scapegoating, more witchhunting, and so we find among them still richer soil for conspiracy theories.

Nuclear Family (Anglo-Saxon & Paris Basin) Script

[57] The salient feature of the dominant class in Anglo-Saxon and Paris basin cultures is individualism. This feature accounts at least in part for the possibility of the French Revolution and its values of liberty and equality; but France's individualism is not as unqualified as England's and that of the dominant population of the United States.<14>

[58] In absolute nuclear cultures, the individual is supreme. Individuals will still join groups and submit to group-identifying rites of initiation or certification (baptism, matrimony, graduation, certification to practice medicine, law, plumbing, etc.), but the individual always ranks above the group, so that, despite the rites, he/she feels entitled to walk out if group pressures threaten his/her sense of self. The popular line from U.S. television sitcoms, "I'm outa here!" is an eloquent cultural indicator. Put differently, external norms, authorities, and boundaries are seen as useful, but only insofar as they work to the individual's advantage. That advantage is usually defined in terms of what works, and what works is in turn often cast in terms of material/economic/quantitative value. Thus authority is relative to its function. There is no automatic hierarchy of social standing or of socially approved behavior, no automatic superior and inferior roles or jobs, no automatic insiders and outsiders. Everything is evaluated according to its utility to the individual. Better and worse are determined by associated earning power, not by some abstract tradition that declares certain persons, things, or actions clean or unclean. Since the individual is supreme, and since utility for individual advancement is the norm for evaluating, the person is considered innocent until proven guilty - unlike in authoritarian societies where the person (subordinate) is presumed guilty until proven innocent. Put differently, boundaries tend to be porous: there are few taboos, few absolutely forbidden pursuits.

[59] Because individuality is supreme, the pursuit and expression of personal differences are encouraged and celebrated. Charles de Gaulle once remarked, "How can you govern a country that makes 365 kinds of cheese?" (quoted in Hall and Hall: 105). However, the exclamation, "Vive la differance!" is not without its irony and internal contradiction. The French in general, and the French of the Paris basin in particular, are a curious mixture of seeming contradictions. Caught between the poles of England and Italy, they struggle with the dominant values of both cultures. They affirm the universalist ideals of their Roman mentality while at the same time affirming the individualist ideals of personal freedom so celebrated in the Revolution, and they are obsessed with egalitarianism, a value that ironically implies inequality (see Peyrefitte: 251-56). Thus they insist on equality while at the same time insisting on individuality over conformity. The dominant values of both north and south somehow combine in an uneasy détente between authoritarianism and laissez-faireism precisely in France's midsection, the Paris basin.

[60] Like the English, the Parisian French will take a keen interest in personal differences but be less free in pursuing them. In personal encounters, individualists will tend first to identify what makes them different from everyone else, unlike authoritarian and strong-group societies which de-emphasize individual differences as potentially threatening to right order and group identity. So when individualists encounter authoritarian persons - say, Tyrrell or Loisy or Pius X - they will exhibit sharply different interests and agenda, as they see themselves and their worlds quite differently. The kind of individualism exhibited by Loisy, for example, would be qualified by the values of equality and fraternity. As his family of origin was non-elite, Loisy would be predisposed to blame authorities - state or church - for discrepancies between values and experience; authorities in turn would chastise him for insubordination. If they punished him by some form of expulsion, he, as committed to the values of equality and fraternity, would take expulsion much harder than would someone like Tyrrell from an absolute nuclear culture that is more committed to individualism, less to fraternity and equality, and therefore less to belonging to a group. (In making such comparisons, I am speaking only of the broad socio-psychological influences. There are obviously particular family-formational influences that would affirm, enhance, or even counteract the broader social ones. Since access to the details of family influence is quite limited, whatever judgments or comparisons I make regarding individual "Modernists" are done only tentatively.)

[61] Apropos of this observation is how these two nuclear societies deal with perceived deviance. In authoritarian and strong group societies, deviance is defined as the violation of clear, distinct, and long-standing boundaries. In individualist societies, however, boundaries are porous - more so in absolute than in egalitarian nuclear societies - and evaluated according to personal, practical advantage, so that the "deviant" is the one who has failed to "measure up" to the competition and/or has "dropped out" due to some individual failure - perhaps stupidity, but certainly not moral failure. In authoritarian and strong group societies, the common charge is that, if you are out of place, it is not because you do not know better. The rules are clear and precise; deviance occurs because you are a bad person. It became a common joke among accused English liberals to say that in Rome's view, if you were a doctrinal deviant, it was due not to a legitimate difference of, say, philosophical viewpoints, but to some private moral failure such as a priest's keeping a mistress.

[62] In Rome the remedy for such deviance is, of course, confession and repentance, but in France and England the remedy is education. This was Edmond Demolins' prescription for France's poor showing against England in the world economic standings at the turn of the century. In his A quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons? he suggested that British superiority in nearly everything, but particularly in the race for world domination through colonization, was due to an educational system that trained the young to be independent, self-reliant, can-do people, whereas the French trained their young to rely on others - parents, family, the state. The obvious solution was to change the educational system (Demolins). We see in this anecdote the Parisian medial position between England and Italy. The French see and desire the ends and means that England already realizes, whereas these are barely conceivable for the Italians.

[63] In individualist societies egocentrism - here intended descriptively, not moralistically - is normative. Inhabitants perceive themselves as in charge of their lives, their destinies, their own space in the cosmos. Consequently they will resist orders from on high, unless they accord with their own valuations. Thus tension between authoritarian and nuclear cultures is systemic, and it only takes a provocation such as the "Modernists" provided the Vatican to set the two at loggerheads.

[64] As to joining groups, the individualist will do so not because she or he values belongingness as intrinsic to being human, but only because (and if) belonging to a particular group might enhance her or his prospects. Similarly, ethical mores in individualist societies also begin from the individual. Good and bad are defined by what is good or bad first for the individual, only secondarily for the group.

[65] Corporations (consider here the Vatican) generally correspond to the authoritarian family, with a boss at the top and a hierarchical arrangement of subordinates gyrating around the central authority. Even if there is a board of directors, its function is to come up with a concerted, authoritative policy. Individualists (consider here "Modernists") working within corporations will inevitably experience dissonance, because they are required to subordinate their individuality to the goals of the corporation. Moreover, because persons are not born to position but have to earn it, those lower down the ladder tend to see higher-ups as competitors who not only have unfair advantage but unfairly demand results while threatening to withdraw support. Thus individualists see corporate society as a source of both unremitting worry and rich rewards. The rewards are richly prized precisely because they are gained against threatening odds. Given this sense of unremitting unfairness along with the pragmatic axiom that the end justifies the means, inhabitants of this system easily feel justified in using practically any means to gain their end. Thus aggression, self-seeking, and corruption become characteristic features of this society. Other societes have their own deceits arising from their own dynamic.

[66] Ironically, perhaps, individualist societies tend to be Rousseauian about human nature. Individualists hold the accused innocent until proven guilty. Thus the characteristic attitude toward the young is that they are innocent, naturally good, and so, if tainted authorities do not interfere, the young will naturally do the right thing. Nor do the young have to be disciplined to fit into society - that is an authoritarian notion. Individuals will fit in if and when they need to (notice how graduation magically transforms students from grunge to white collar). Meanwhile they should simply be allowed to do their own thing and develop at their own pace without interference from authorities. Here again we see systemic tension between individualist and authoritarian societies (so too between "Modernists" and the Vatican).

[67] Tension also arises over different valuations of time. Because individualists are competitively self-made, they view their life's span with greater urgency: one span is all one has to get where one is going. Unlike in strong group societies where folks graze in the indefinite lifetime of the group, and unlike in authoritarian societies where time extends indefinitely into the past and future, time for individualists is always in short supply.

[68] This shortage of time also gives individualists a peculiar take on history. It breeds a high-risk, venturesome spirit that rushes with abandon toward a short-term future and cares little for the past. Nor is the risk run on behalf of others. The individual is not interested in sacrificing to create an environment that might be conducive to others' achievement and individuality, particularly unborn others who are not even part of the competition. As to the aged, they can no longer achieve, are out of the competition, and therefore can be disregarded as irrelevant. Traditions gain no stature by reason of age. In fact, being old can work against them. They must submit to the same competitive scrutiny as every other idea. Thus the Vatican would see as tampering what the "Modernists" saw as necessary investigation of tradition.

[69] A correlative value of individualism is tolerance. The rule is that everyone is supposed to become an individual, but this can happen only if everyone agrees to tolerate individual differences. Consequently, while authoritarian and strong group societies honor conformity, individualist societies honor diversity. Thus, the "Modernists" would expect their "investigations" to be tolerated if not honored; the Vatican would instinctively distrust them, if not reject them out of hand.

[70] What about non-elites in individualist societies? How do they react when their experiences and values do not match their expectations or the expectations of the dominant elite? The short answer is that they tend to drop out. Not that they no longer espouse the values of the elite - they still love individuality - but they do not want it on elitist terms, namely, to earn it by competition. They want to be accepted for what they are at the moment, not for what they can become, especially at the high cost dictated by higher-ups. Non-elites tend to set themselves against the elitist agenda by eschewing competition and forming support groups to sustain them. These are not long-standing or formalized groups; they last only long enough for the member to grow out of the need and to move on. In time, the dropout usually elects to re-enter the competitive mainstream of the dominant culture. Such behavior is typical among adolescents and students, whose protest often takes the form of underachievement. George Tyrrell in his early years comes to mind (see below).

[71] The protest song of non-elites in high-achieving individualist societies is "all you need is love." Everything else, all the competitive striving leads only to strife and to all the evils of society. The non-elites can easily buy into the stated simplicity of the Gospels (Malina 1986: 96). But to sustain themselves against the dominant culture, they tend to find some kind of support group. Even within these groups, however, each person feels he or she stands alone, because each still remains an individualist. Tyrrell with his "Modernist" friends comes to mind.

[72] The goal of such a posture is the sense of contentment that comes from setting oneself against the false, social thrust of the high achievers. Stated more positively, non-elites see the elitist social world as unnatural, as a sham achieved at the expense of all that is natural ( = the true, the good, the innocent). Their message is Rousseau's: live and let live; do not interfere; children are born naturally good and are best raised by not interfering with their self-expression, except to teach them not to despoil the way elites do.

[73] Boundaries for non-elites tend to be porous and indistinct, because distinctions are considered artifices of the elite, expressions of their competitive structures that ravage nature. In nature there is no distinction between sacred and profane, public and private. Everything and everyone is free to be and do according to each one's nature. Thus "Modernists" would tend to find the sacred rather within one's self than in the externals of religion, and thus they could more easily "tamper" with Sacred Scripture and the Catholic belief system; anti-Modernists not so.

An adjustment of Scripts

[74] Malina's elaboration of Douglas' work, incorporating the social theory of Michael Thompson and the insights of René Thom, suggests convincingly that the four-fold population model I have been using so far is too limited to account for certain social behaviors and groupings (1986: 61-64). Without using his terminology, but sticking with the terminology adopted for this paper, the scheme of population groupings can be expanded to eight by inserting a "social catchment area" into each of the four groups. The "catchment areas" group people who, for one reason or another, do not identify with any of the four major groups but are nonetheless closely related to a certain group and in tension with it, either as drop-outs, social critics, or social "wannabe's." The adjustment would go like this: the two dominant social groupings (family types) that faced off in the Modernist crisis were the authoritarian (stem) and the absolute and/or egalitarian nuclear families. I have been referring to these two sets as the authoritarian vs. the individualist systems. These two categories in turn are divided between the elites and the non-elites to yield four categories: authoritarian elites, authoritarian non-elites, individualist elites, and individualist non-elites. If we allow each of these four a social catchment area, we arrive at eight distinct groupings.

[75] In the individualist elite category found in England, for example, we would find a significant proportion - even the majority - of the population occupying the lower rungs of status ranking, who nonetheless continue to emulate the values and goals of the elite system in which they are embedded, rather than allow themselves to fall into the non-elite counter-system. The non-elites of both individualist and authoritarian systems in turn have their own social catchment areas representing the extreme "dropouts" of those population groupings.

[76] For those who occupy the catchment area in authoritarian societies and remain oriented toward elitist values, the script allows for minimal autonomy, as their lives are largely controlled by vertical superiors and rules of social stratification. Generally, they are stuck in their ascribed station, with little scope for higher aspirations, scant access to reins of power, and minimal participation in decision-making. In individualist societies, the rules governing achievement generally prevent those in the catchment area from ever vaulting into the achievement-assessment rank; consequently they too are peripheral to all decision-making.

[77] In the end, most people in catchment areas attain a meaningful life through conformity. Those from authoritarian societies conform by compliance, going along with the system because that is what everyone is supposed to do; while those from individualist societies conform by congruence, rationalizing for themselves that conformity is appropriate in their situation - ironically, they make up their own mind to conform.

Part Three: Testing the Model

How Family Systems Apply to Loisy and Tyrrell vis-à-vis Pius X

[78] To begin, it might be helpful to see a schematic comparing the salient features of the Modernist over against the anti-Modernist "family." For brevity, I will treat the two nuclear family types (Modernist) as one.

[79] Given the relationship between the family types that typify the anti-Modernists and the Modernists, what sort of transactional dynamics would one expect in any attempt to communicate between representatives from these two largely antithetical worlds of discourse? The two world views are so diverse that, given enough stress, they could readily be construed as holding mutually exclusive rather than complementary values. Indeed, one would expect such a reading from the Vatican, since its posture tends toward exclusivity rather than inclusivity. That is, as authoritarian, the Vatican insists that its own world view is the only valid one; so the world views of the "Modernists" are to be rejected out of hand.

[80] To illustrate what I mean, let me briefly describe two transactions from the Modernist period. Take the case of George Tyrrell. Although he was born in Dublin, his family on his father's side originated in Oxford. His Tory grandfather settled in Dublin around 1800. His mother was a native Dubliner, but of the minority non-Catholic population. As limitations of space preclude any extended argument about Tyrrell's family system, suffice it to say that his Autobiography presents ample evidence to establish that his upbringing, although it occurred in and around Dublin (designated by Todd as an authoritarian/stem family region), bears all the earmarks of the absolute nuclear family of the minority Protestant population (see Petre: 1:194-229). Moreover, although by ancestry he would have fallen among the elite, by upbringing he fell into the "social catchment area" between the elites and non-elites. This change happened after the death of his father, when his family fell into a hand-to-mouth vagabond existence. His older brother Willie and sometimes his sister Louy were sent off to board, while his mother took up household employment among the more elite Protestant families and raised George in low church evangelicalism. However, the family never adopted the non-elite ideology, because, though poor, they always faced upwards toward the values from which they came. One could cite such evidence of their elitist values as Willie's education and brilliant career at Trinity College, Louy's studying German and going with her mother to live in Bonn, and George's migration from St. George's evangelicalism to Grangegorman's high-churchism, then traveling to London where, after converting to Roman Catholicism, he joined the elitist Society of Jesus - or so it was regarded by both the Roman Catholic and Anglican elite of England.

[81] George was a thoroughgoing individualist. Once a Jesuit, he was bound to clash with the authoritarian values of the post-Restoration Society of Jesus, at least insofar as policy was dictated by Rome (See Schultenover 1981; 1993; Sagovsky). Had he never been drawn into direct confrontation with Roman Jesuit and Vatican authorities, he probably would never have been dismissed from the order and excommunicated but would have lived out his life in relative peace as a Jesuit. I say "relative," because not only by cultural placement (the above-mentioned "catchment area" which always exists in tension between elitist and non-elitist values) but also by personality (he claims to have inherited his father's irascible temperament), he would clash with his English superiors. His clashes with them, however, were never as sharp as with Roman/Vatican superiors, because he and his English superiors shared many basic values. Indeed, the evidence shows that by and large Tyrrell's English superiors took his side against Rome, for which several of them suffered reprisals (Schultenover 1993: 66, 75, 80, 88-92, 113, 136f., 143-48).

[82] Tyrell demonstrated his independence of thought and judgment from the outset of his Jesuit life, and it meant trouble. During his two years of novitiate, he regularly squabbled with Fr. John Morris, his master of novices, over what he regarded as an elitist - and false - enculturation of the gospel. Because of his contentiousness, Morris refused him permission to pronounce vows. Tyrrell, true to form, appealed the decision to his provincial, who found in Tyrrell's favor (see Petre: 1:194-229). This reprieve, however, meant that Tyrrell would live the rest of his Jesuit life in raw tension between elitism and non-elitism. One hurdle crossed, he held his querulous spirit in check for some dozen years - except for carefully controlled, private expression - and excelled enough to be ordained and appointed professor at the school of philosophy for young Jesuits, St. Mary's Hall, Stonyhurst. It was an elitist position of distinction.

[83] Having met elitist goals, Tyrrell immediately reverted to his non-elitist protest against what he regarded as the elitist bogus Christianity of the post-Restoration Society of Jesus and the contemporary Catholic Church. Thus he came into conflict with two fellow faculty members at St. Mary's Hall, Charles Coupe and Bernard Boedder. This storm too he probably would have weathered, except that Coupe and particularly Boedder had come to identify rather thoroughly with Vatican authoritarianism - which was not surprising for Boedder, as he stemmed from an authoritarian German family. Both sides appealed to Rome. Predictably, Tyrrell lost and was sent to the Farm Street House of Writers in London, where he joined the staff of the Month. There he began a writing career that thrust him into an escalating confrontation with Roman and Vatican authorities. It would end in his dismissal from the Jesuits and excommunication from the church. Perhaps it even hastened his death (Schultenover 1981: 424 n. 200; 405-7 nn. 95, 114, 117).

[84] On 19 February 1906, having signed his letters of dismissal, Tyrrell wrote to his superior general, Luis Martín, in Rome:

I should like to assure you, now that I stand outside the Society, how completely I realise that we have both of us been driven to this unpleasant issue by the necessities of our several minds & consciences; & Your Paternity, still more, by the exigencies of a most difficult position. . . . Nothing could be further from my sentiments than any sort of personal rancour or resentment. I feel that it is a collision of systems & tendencies rather than of persons; & that many such collisions must occur before the truth of both sides meets in some higher truth.

Tyrrell was convinced that Martín had received a mot d'ordre from the pope to find a plausible occasion to dismiss him. On 9 March 1906 he wrote to his friend Maude Petre,

Know once & for all that it is now perfectly plain that all my correspondence with the General from Aug. 6 to Jan. 1. has had nothing to do with my expulsion. A mot d'ordre (this is strictly confidential) was given by the Pope to the General of the Dominicans (which I have read) & therefore also to the other Generals as well as to the bishops, to help him to crush out this liberal neo-Catho[lic] movement.

That, of course, would have been a general order from Pius X. Whether there was another, specific order for Martín to get rid of Tyrrell is unknown, but there is evidence that, whether the order was general or specific, Martín asked Cardinal Domenico Ferrata, archbishop of Milan, to move against Tyrrell after excerpts from his Letter to a University Professor appeared in translation, in the Corriere della Sera (Milan) of 1 January 1906. This event triggered Tyrrell's expulsion (see Schultenover 1981: 319ff.). My point is that throughout the whole of Tyrrell's growing disaffection from the Society of Jesus, which he dated from the Stonyhurst episode, two very different styles of human interaction were at loggerheads. Tyrrell saw the difference and named it: "several minds & consciences . . . a collision of systems & tendencies rather than of persons."

[85] Alfred Loisy was also caught in "a collision of systems & tendencies," but in his case there was also more personal feeling involved. The title of the authorized English translation of his Choses Passées (1913), My Duel with the Vatican, is apt. Events of early 1904 following the publication of L'Évangile et l'Église (1902) and Autour d'un petit livre (1903) can stand as typifying the entire conflict between the "Modernists" and the anti-Modernists. Loisy's whole comportment in the face of Vatican demands that he unconditionally repudiate these and three other books was governed by his need, as he said, "not to escape excommunication, but to safeguard my moral integrity" (1968: 262). This statement expresses in nuce the impasse between the authoritarian and the nuclear family mindsets, the former demanding unconditional submission, the latter regarding such an act as morally perverse.

[86] In L'Évangile et l'Église (The Gospel and the Church), Loisy tried to defend the authentic tradition of the church against Harnack's attempt to determine historically the essence of the gospel and to play this off against tradition as spurious. In the process Loisy argued that (1) we do not get anything of the "pure gospel" apart from tradition, that, whether we trust tradition or regard it with suspicion, "we know Christ only by . . . tradition"; and (2) we must "distinguish between the personal religion of Jesus and the way in which His disciples have understood it, between the thought of the Master and the interpretations of apostolic tradition"; but nevertheless (3) tradition, by a divinely guided process of development, preserves intact the unchanging "essence" of Christianity, which is found not (pace Harnack) "in a few fragments of his discourse," but "in the fullness and totality" of the Christian life, in the whole "work of Jesus" (1976: 13, 12, 16, 13).

[87] The facts of the Vatican reaction to Loisy's agenda are well known. What remains to be explained are the motives behind them. Why was the Vatican so reactive against L'Évangile et l'Église, when Loisy thought he was dutifully and loyally serving the church by convincingly answering Harnack's attack on the validity of ecclesiastical tradition? Why could the Vatican not accept Loisy's apologetic?

[88] Numerous factors came into play. First, the church-state factor ratcheted up tensions in the Vatican. Ever since the French Revolution the Vatican's relationship with France was, to say the least, strained, but it was rapidly approaching nadir right around the turn of the century. On 9 September 1899 Dreyfus was again found guilty at a retrial in Rennes, "a hotbed of Royalist and Catholic fanaticism" (Phillips: 258). Waldeck-Rousseau, who had championed Dreyfus' cause against a Catholic-inspired prosecution, vowed that not only would he secure justice for Dreyfus, but he would put the church in its place. Immediately upon becoming minister of the interior he began to draft legislation that eventually became, on 2 July 1901, the famous Law of Associations, severely curbing the influence of religious orders in France. After 1902 Émile Combes, who succeeded Waldeck-Rousseau, rigorously interpreted the Law and within a year closed some 12,000 Catholic schools and dispersed some 30,000 religious (see Aubert: 76; Phillips: 259-75). - all this just when Loisy's L'Évangile et l'Église was under review by the Vatican. Amazingly enough, Loisy was at the same time fishing among Roman contacts for an episcopal appointment (see O'Connell: 236-41, 245, 250). Compared to the church-state situation in France, Loisy and his writings were minor annoyances that required summary treatment. At least, so it would seem from an authoritarian perspective.<15>

[89] On 20 July 1903 Pope Leo XIII died. On 4 August Giuseppe Sarto, cardinal patriarch of Venice, succeeded him as Pope Pius X, and Raphael Merry del Val became his secretary of state and the one to deal most directly with the French situation and Alfred Loisy.<16> On 16 December, the Holy Office of the Inquisition placed five of Loisy's works on the Index. Merry del Val - now Cardinal - forwarded the notice of condemnation to Cardinal Richard of Paris, Loisy's bishop, and appended a note dated 19 December and signed by him, in which Loisy gave as the reason for this decision "the extremely grave errors which fill these volumes to overflowing" (1968: 342: "gli errori gravissimi che rigurgitano in quei volumi"; see also 1931: 2:272-342, especially 286, 301, 305, where he plays on the Italian rigurgitano and French regorgent: "Le cardinal Merry del Val en éprouvait aussi l'envie de vomir" [301]). On 11 January 1904, after some epistolary consultation with Friedrich von Hügel, Loisy replied to Merry del Val:

. . . I receive with respect the judgment of the Sacred Congregations [sic], and I myself condemn whatever may be found in my writings that is reprehensible.

I must add, nevertheless, that my adherence to the sentence of the Sacred Congregations is purely disciplinary in character. I reserve the right of my own conscience, and I do not intend, in inclining myself before the judgment rendered by the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, either to abandon or to retract the opinions which I have uttered in my capacity of historian and of critical exegete. Not that I attach to these opinions a certitude that their character does not admit of; as I have never ceased to complete and to correct them, to the best of my ability, during many years of labor, I am assured that they will be completed or corrected, by myself or by others, in the future. But in the existing state of my knowledge, and in default of more complete and more solid information, they constitute the only form in which I can represent to myself the history of the sacred books and that of religion (1968: 251).<17>

Just the wrong thing to say. . . .

[90] The opposition here is between two dichotomous mindsets: one subordinates history to dogma (Vatican), the other dogma to history (Modernist). The dichotomy need not be impassable, if the two mindsets could come to see their relative positions as possibly complementary rather than mutually exclusive. However, such a shift would involve dialogue, and dialogue involves a number of implications not congenial to the authoritarian mindset: a search for common ground, an a priori mutuality and a presumption of validity to the other side, recognition of the incompleteness of one's own truth and empathetic entry into the other's point of view while suspending one's own, a willingness to embrace the other's truth and be changed by it, and a rejection of the position that one side has the final answer and engages in "dialogue" only to win the other side over (for a lucid treatment of ground rules for dialogue, see Hill, Knitter, and Madges: 187-220).

[91] By culture, Loisy and most "Modernists" embraced the principles of dialogue; the Vatican did not, because dialogue implies a relativity between partners, and this the Vatican could accept.<18> So when Loisy attempted negotiating with the Vatican, the outcome was predictable. His 11 January letter to Merry del Val implies some positions that culturally the Vatican was simply unable to consider. The dogmatic assumption that the Vatican possesses the final truth puts it in a position to dictate and demand. For Loisy to reply, "I receive with respect the judgment of the Sacred Congregations," is tantamount to praying, "Dear God, I have received your message and humbly respect your viewpoint." That alone would have thrown Merry del Val into a frenzy. Then for Loisy to add "that my adherence to the sentence . . . is purely disciplinary," is to suggest that the sentence bears only a relative validity and does not touch the real truth of the matter. Indeed, he went on to suggest that he was beholden to an authority higher than that of the Holy Office: his own conscience. And to what did his conscience bind him? The findings of historical criticism. Thus by further implication, he was granting to historical criticism an authority that could not be contravened by ecclesiastical authority: both authorities were legitimate, but in their own spheres. Loisy could and would submit to such disciplinary demands as giving up his position at the École Pratique des Hautes Études, but he did not have within him the power to submit to a blanket, dogmatic contention that his writings were replete with error. He had come to his conclusions as a historian, and the Vatican had no authority, under the power of the keys, to declare his conclusions false. If church officials, on the basis of the same historical method, could demonstrate which of his conclusions were in error and why, then he would be more than willing to repudiate them. But he could not in conscience unconditionally disavow historical findings simply on the basis of a church edict, however authoritative. In fact, in a letter to Giovanni Genocchi of 31 January 1904, Loisy declared, "My conscience is just as sacred as the authority of the Holy Office. . . . The Church has left me one fine thing, my reputation as an honest man and a sincere scholar. I am keeping it" [his emphasis].<19>

[92] Loisy and Merry del Val were deadlocked. Dialogue might have broken the stalemate, but the authoritarian posture of the Vatican vis-á-vis Loisy's insistence on the exercise of individual conscience foreclosed dialogue, because, for "Modernists," exercise of individual conscience is a sine qua non of dialogue. So the real impasse was between two distinct mindsets, which, unless one or the other or both conceded a certain relativity to their own positions, had to go their separate ways. Without relativity on both sides, true dialogue was impossible. Historically and culturally, the "Modernists" were doomed. Since the French Revolution and the loss of the Papal States, the Vatican by and large adopted a posture of intransigence. Leo XIII gave a bit of ground with his ralliement, but Pius X and Merry del Val took it back. Moreover, it seems that whatever control the church lost to the state, the Vatican determined to compensate for by a more rigid internal control (see Kurtz). The "Modernists" raised their heads at a most inconvenient time.

[93] However, Loisy in late February 1904, aware that a sentence of excommunication passed on him "would have disheartened, enraged, or compromised . . . a very large number of young priests" (Loisy 1931: 2:352), determined to try to head off the sentence. The situation did not look promising. By 1 March the press was already publishing reports based on reliable sources that the Holy Office had initiated excommunication procedures.<20> On the advice of two friends, Loisy wrote directly to Pius X on 28 February, offering to abandon his chair at the École and suspend his scientific publications. Loisy thought his offer a supreme sacrifice, but it turned out, as his confidant François Thureau-Dangin later told him, that he had "retreated only to make a further leap" (Loisy 1968: 263). What Thureau-Dangin meant was that Loisy had cut a brutta figura by the very style of his letter. To the pope's mind, he should have continued to work through his local padrone, Cardinal Richard, rather than appeal directly to the pope; furthermore, he had used words of such intimacy that Pius could only have taken them as an affront.

[94] Loisy began his ill-fated letter: "Most Holy Father: I well know Your Holiness's goodness of heart, and it is to your heart that I now address myself." Loisy first declared his desire to remain in communion with the church and to avoid contributing in any way to "the ruin of the faith in France," but then he included a statement demanded by his own integrity but guaranteed to infuriate the pontiff: "It is beyond my power to destroy in myself the result of my labors. So far as in me lies, I submit myself to the judgment brought against my writings by the Congregation of the Holy Office" (Loisy 1968: 262).

[95] Pius answered through Richard, who summoned Loisy on 11 March to hear the pope's reply. At the audience the following day Richard began by denying news reports of that very morning that the Holy Office had already pronounced excommunication; he then refused to let Loisy see the letter - written in Italian - but gave him a running translation. "The pains which the Cardinal took to deny" the news reports, Loisy later reflected, "and the omission of a portion of the Papal missive as he read it to me, gave me grounds for thinking that Pius X had used this means either of setting aside the excommunication or of empowering the Cardinal to do so" (Loisy 1968: 264; see also 1931: 2:360).

[96] The pope began: "I have received a letter from Abbé Loisy . . . in which he appeals to my heart; but he did not write it from his heart." He went on to acknowledge that Loisy's offer to end his teaching and writing gave some comfort, but that all his apparent good will was vitiated "by the explicit protestation that it was not within his power to renounce the results of his work." It was "absolutely necessary," Pius said, "that, confessing his own errors, he submit totally and without reservation, to the judgment pronounced by the Holy Office against his writings." He then added the final nail: "The Church, far from imposing silence on him, will be very happy if he could demonstrate the purity and integrity of his retractions by putting into practice the precept given by Saint Rémi to Clovis: 'Succende quod adorasti, et adora quod incendisti [Burn what you have adored, and adore what you have burned].'" He then advised that Loisy submit himself to prayer and concluded that this present effort to save him would be the "last act of paternal charity" (Loisy 1931: 2:361).

[97] This letter, and particularly the opening sentence, snuffed out in Loisy whatever hope he might have harbored for continued membership and service in the church. True, the final break did not occur until 1908, but the cord was cut here. Of that moment Loisy (nine years later) wrote:

When the opening words greeted my ears, something gave way within me. The Head of that Church to which I had devoted my life, for which I had so abundantly labored for thirty years past, which I had loved and could not help loving still, outside of which I had neither ambition nor hope of any kind, when I had responded to absurd demands by offering a supreme sacrifice, could find nothing else to say to me than the harsh words: 'That letter, addressed to my heart, was not written from the heart!' But it was, all the same! It had pressed into it the last drop of feeling left in my Catholic soul for the distress from which the Church was suffering, in some small degree through what I had done, but in no sense from any fault of mine. And because I asked to be allowed to die peaceably in that Church of my baptism, without being constrained to prevaricate in order to remain in it, I had to be taken for a person insincerely posing as a martyr, for an individual so insanely conceited as to wish to appear a victim (this, verily, was the idea of Pius X), and to affect a renunciation of something for which he cared not at all, when what was asked of him was simply nothing, or next to nothing: namely, to uphold as true what he perfectly well knew to be false, and, reciprocally, to reject as false what he clearly knew in his heart to be true! Still other experiences were required to bring me to the point of no longer even wishing to be a Catholic; but this one was decisive above all others (1968: 265-66).

[98] Here and throughout all of his lengthy reflections on his relationship with church authorities, Loisy showed himself to be as innocent of them as they were of him and his kind - not innocent of behavior but of the underlying social motives and dynamics of each other's behavior. Had he been acquainted with the results of current socio-cultural and anthropological studies, he would have known to expect precisely the kind of reaction he got. As embedded in an authoritarian/stem "family" system and living in the myth of "the best of all possible worlds," the pope would expect (a) conformity to group identity and values from all of his subjects and (b) a high degree of fit between his expectations and his experience. Loisy would know that in the papal world where group identity is strong and strongly guarded, there would be great concern for "purity" and thus for policing boundaries between insiders and outsiders. He would know that the exercise of individualism is reserved only for those at the pinnacle of hierarchical power, and that anyone else who attempts it has broken faith. He would know to expect a clash between Vatican authoritarianism and Parisian nuclear-egalitarianism, especially at such a moment of severe cultural stress, when France was - as the Vatican saw it - disinheriting the Catholic Church of its most reliable means of controlling its people, namely, its schools. He would know that in moments of cultural stress authoritarian families tend to dysfunction, so that especially now, in 1904 when a severe church-state crisis was abuilding, the Vatican would react with unaccustomed ferocity. Perhaps, had Loisy known all this, his expectations would have prepared him for Pius X's "dure parole." As it turned out, they dealt a mortal wound to his declining faith.

[99] Here is where George Tyrrell, as an absolute nuclear offspring, was less vulnerable. He had from infancy inherited a much more insular comportment, so that his faith was able to survive the kind of treatment that Loisy's could not abide.

A Concluding Implication for Systematics

[100] Marvin O'Connell, in his impressive Critics on Trial, claims that Pius X, in condemning Modernism, "could never have spoken otherwise, unless he was prepared to jettison the whole of Catholic tradition" (344). This statement can be construed as either true or false, depending on one's perspective. From the Vatican's absolute authoritarian perspective, it is true, for according to its lights the Vatican could not grant any kind of relativity to its and the church's knowledge and expression of revelation. Even on such a preposterous doctrine as the linkage of Catholicism to a philosophy, it had to remain adamant.

[101] However, that linkage is precisely what the "Modernists" challenged, because to their mind ahistorical scholasticism, as an exclusive and self-sufficient vehicle for interpreting and handing on a revelation so grounded in history, was at best inadequate and at worst seriously misleading. And so O'Connell's claim, from the viewpoint of historically based theology, is false. The Incarnation means that revelation comes in and through history. Vatican II affirmed what many "Modernists" held, namely, that truth, and so too revelation, lies not only in the Catholic Church but beyond her borders as well and therefore overreaches the church's disciplinary authority. Thus, an absolutist, authoritarian viewpoint is inconsistent with the very nature of the church. The "Modernists" sensed this and were among the first to herald the current ecumenical paradigm in which the Catholic church must lose itself to find itself.

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